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This important edited collection addresses ethical issues associated with solar radiation 
management (SRM), a category of climate engineering techniques that would increase the 
planet’s reflectivity in order to offset some of the impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Such 
techniques include injecting sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere or brightening marine clouds 
with seawater. Although SRM has the potential to cool the planet by reducing the amount of 
incoming solar radiation absorbed by the planet, it raises a wide array of difficult and interesting 
ethical issues. Engineering the Climate makes an important contribution to addressing many of 
these issues. 
 
The collection is composed of an introduction and thirteen original contributions from various 
authors. Space limitations make it impossible to discuss each essay in detail, so I shall instead 
focus my remarks on those contributions I suspect would be of most interest to likely readers of 
this journal, although I will mention all the essays in the book. 
 
Apart from the introduction,  in which Christopher Preston offers a helpful overview of the 
“ethical terrain” of SRM and concisely sketches each contribution, the book is divided into five 
sections. The first of these, “Present and Future Generations,” includes essays by Marion 
Hourdequin (“Geoengineering, Solidarity, and Moral Risk”), Konrad Ott (“Might Solar 
Radiation Management Constitute a Dilemma?”), and Patrick Taylor Smith (“Domination and 
the Ethics of Solar Radiation Management”). 
 
Hourdequin argues that SRM poses a particularly worrisome threat to climate justice, namely 
that it could undermine moral solidarity, thus making a just, long-term solution to climate change 
more difficult to achieve. This is so for three reasons. First, SRM could diffuse the energy, 
attention, and resources we have available to spend on solutions to climate change. Second, SRM 
could introduce new inequities disfavorable to parties who are already disadvantaged in other 
repsects, thus creating additional divides between currently existing groups. Third, SRM could 
exacerbate intergenerational injustice, potentially harming future persons by committing them to 
the risks of both SRM and past greenhouse gas emissions, thereby producing a divide between 
present and future generations. Hourdequin advocates cultivating moral solidarity “through a 
sense of our common humanity and an empathetic understanding of one another as living beings 
with interests, needs, and vulnerabilities” (p. 30). If SRM indeed threatens such endeavors, then 
we have some ethical reason to be wary of SRM. I do wonder, however, how strong this 
objection to SRM is in practice. Arguably, humanity’s current moral solidarity is regrettably 
rather weak, and so further threats to it might be less worrisome than they would be if our 
solidarity was currently robust. Still, it might be reasonable to hope that we can substantially 
enhance moral solidarity in the future, and in that case we would have reason to avoid new 
pursuits that threaten this project. 
 
Konrad Ott argues that SRM deployment would impose a moral dilemma on future generations, 
because future persons may have strong moral reasons both to stop SRM (e.g., to avert harmful 
side-effects of it) and to continue SRM (e.g., to avoid the risks tied to the rapid global warming 
that would result from discontinuing SRM). He reasons that it is “morally repugnant” to pursue 
actions that risk imposing dilemmas on others, and so it would be morally repugnant for the 
present generation to deploy SRM. Ott acknowledges that SRM might not yield a genuine moral 
dilemma in the sense understood by many moral philosophers, for it might turn out that some 
future generation has an all-things-considered reason to opt for either continuing or stopping 
SRM (p. 40). I would add that genuine moral dilemmas are usually understood to be cases in 
which it is impossible to avoid moral wrong-doing, and it is not clear that some future generation 
would act wrongly in either stopping or continuing a project to which they did not consent. 
Nonetheless, should humanity opt to deploy SRM, Ott makes a plausible case that future 
generations would then face a very difficult choice. 
 
Taylor Smith contends that “SRM as the sole or primary response to climate change” would be 
“deeply problematic” because it would exacerbate the present generation’s domination of future 
generations (p. 59). Domination occurs when one party arbitrarily exercises superior power over 
another party and thereby constrains the options available to the latter. If the present generation 
deployed SRM without accompanying emissions mitigation and adaptation, they would 
dominate the future. This is because, as we have already seen in Ott’s contribution, future 
persons would be faced with either maintaining SRM (and tolerating any ills associated with it) 
or stopping SRM (and facing the severe risks of abrupt warming in the wake of cessation). 
Importantly, this would still count as domination even if we assume that SRM would secure a 
decent standard of living for those future persons, for this would simply be a fortunate outcome 
of the past generation’s arbitrary exercise of power. However, Taylor Smith rightly notes that 
these considerations do not entail that SRM could never be ethically permissible, for “a limited 
use of SRM might make it easier to mitigate or adapt and could be temporarily justified on those 
grounds,” but we would first need to be “reasonably confident that its temporary use as a part of 
the solution would not evolve into something more permanent and all-encompassing” (p. 59). 
 
The next section, “Marginalized, Vulnerable, and Voiceless Populations,” includes essays by 
Kyle Powys Whyte (“Indigenous Peoples, Solar Radiation Management, and Consent”), 
Christopher Preston (“Solar Radiation Management and Vulnerable Populations: The Moral 
Deficit and its Prospects”), and Ronald Sandler (“Solar Radiation Management and Nonhuman 
Species”). 
 
Powys Whyte argues that the consent of Indigenous peoples should be sought in advance of 
conducting SRM research. Historically, many advocates of projects having a substantial 
environmental impact (e.g., dam-building in the United States) have not sought the consent of 
Indigenous stakeholders. Powys Whyte worries that this may also occur with research and 
development of SRM projects. For example, some proponents of SRM research might favor 
seeking Indigenous peoples’ consent only after research has been planned and begun, but Powys 
Whyte says that consent (or dissent) at that stage would be “meaningless” (p. 66). To avert a 
situation like this, Powys Whyte argues for a free, prior, and informed consent model when it 
comes to SRM research planning, one in accordance with Indigenous peoples’ “customary laws 
and decision-making processes” (p. 75). 
 
Sandler’s contribution will be of particular interest to many readers of this journal, given how 
little has been written on SRM from an explicitly non-anthropocentric perspective. He argues 
that we have good moral reason both to value non-human species in their own right and to work 
to preserve them. Sandler contends that “the value of species” supports aggressive emissions 
mitgation but does not support SRM, given that the latter does not address some of the ecological 
harms driven by greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., ocean acidification) and is likely to be hard to 
predict and control. Interestingly, he also argues that the value of species does not necessarily 
oppose SRM, because “there may be contexts that would already be sufficiently bleak from the 
perspective of the value of nonhuman species that SRM would not pose a significant further 
threat to their value” (p. 108). However, it seems that whether the value of species supports or 
opposes SRM would depend crucially on the context in which SRM might be pursued. Sandler 
writes that SRM “would not be an effective approach to preserving the human independent 
natural historical value of species” (p. 107). This is very plausible if we compare an “SRM 
world” to a pre-industrial one, but SRM is on the table precisely because we are missing our 
opportunity to maintain something close to the pre-industrial climate. That being the case, 
perhaps in the future no feasible climate policy will do well when it comes to preserving the 
value of species, but it would be surprising if some approaches were not significantly better (or 
less bad) than others. 
 
The volume’s third section, “Moral Hazards and Hidden Benefits,” includes contributions from 
Ben Hale (“The World that Would Have Been: Moral Hazard Arguments Against 
Geoengineering”) and Holly Jean Buck (“Climate Remediation to Address Social Development 
Challenges: Going Beyond Cost-Benefit and Risk Approaches to Assessing Solar Radiation 
Management”). 
 
Hale addresses the idea that succesful deployment of SRM, and perhaps merely the prospect 
thereof, would pose a moral hazard, or “the danger that, in the face of insurance, an agent will 
increase her exposure to risk” (116). He successfully argues that appeals to an SRM-induced 
moral hazard are indeterminate. First, such appeals are ambiguous in that they could express any 
of three distinct worries: that SRM would allow us to avoid making changes to our emissions-
intensive behavior, that SRM will inevitably become part of business as usual, or that SRM 
would encourage certain “perverse” behavior (e.g., increasing our emissions). Second, appeals to 
an SRM moral hazard are vague, because they can be formulated in many ways. Hale discusses 
sixteen such formulations, which fit into three categories: considerations of efficiency (e.g., that 
SRM will be militarized), of responsibility (e.g., that SRM will encourage free-riding), and of 
vice (e.g., that SRM will invite hubris). Because of the many different things that someone might 
have in mind when claiming that SRM poses a moral hazard, Hale argues that general appeals to 
it are not helpful and that we should instead attend to specific arguments regarding the moral 
problems SRM might carry. 
 
Sections four and five speak less obviously and directly to many of the concerns of 
environmental philosophers, but the contributions therein are both interesting and of a high 
quality. The fourth section, “Ethics of Framing and Rhetoric,” features Dane Scott (“Insurance 
Policy or Technological Fix? The Ethical Implications of Framing Solar Radiation 
Management”) and Wylie Carr, Ashley Mercer, and Clare Palmer (“Public Concerns about the 
Ethics of Solar Radiation Management”). The piece by Carr et al. presents and explores 
empirical evidence from a survey of public attitudes toward SRM, including evidence that the 
general public is concerned about a range of ethical issues. 
 
The last section of the volume, “The Cultural Milieu,” includes essays by Albert Borgmann 
(“The Setting of the Scene: Technological Fixes and the Design of the Good Life”), Forrest 
Clingerman (“Between Babel and Pelagius: Religion, Theology, and Geoengineering”), and 
Maialen Galarraga and Bronislaw Szerszynski (“Making Climates: Solar Radiation Management 
and the Ethics of Fabrication”).  Clingerman’s piece will be of particular interest to those 
interested in religious approaches to the ethics of SRM. 
 
Although research on SRM in the humanities and in the natural and social sciences has steadily 
grown since the book’s publication in 2012, the volume is not outdated. This is partly because 
many of the basic ethical issues surrounding SRM remain unresolved or under-explored. 
Moreover, Engineering the Climate is currently the only book wholly devoted to the ethics of 
SRM. Combined with the fact that the contributions in this volume are consistently of high 
quality, this makes the book essential reading for any researcher interested in the ethics of 
climate engineering. It will also appeal to those interested in climate ethics more broadly. I 
highly recommend this volume to anyone sharing these interests. 
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